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CORRECTING CULTURE:
EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND U.S.
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW
Kathy Roberts*

PREFACE

A U.S. corporation hired Vladimir Shekoyan, a legal immigrant
residing in the United States, as a "Training Advisor" to fulfill a contract
with the United States Agency for International Development
(U.S.A.I.D.) in the Republic of Georgia. He claimed his contract was not
renewed because of his national origin. Federal courts refused to
intervene because Vladimir was not a U.S. citizen and his workplace
was outside the United States.'
Luis Reyes-Gaona applied for a job to work in North Carolina as a
farm worker, but the North Carolina Growers Association would not
accept him because he was over forty years old. Federal courts again
refused to intervene, in this case because
Luis was not a U.S. citizen, and
2
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Garland Denty, a U.S. citizen, worked for a Pennsylvania
corporation for several years. He claimed he was denied a promotion
based on his age. Yet again, federal courts refused to intervene since the
job he was denied was outside the United
States, with his employer's
3
British.
was
which
parent corporation,
Federal courts denied a hearing in each of these cases based on the
apparent limitations of civil rights law outside U.S. territory. One might
be surprised, then, to learn that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (Title
VII), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), and the
* Kathy Roberts received her Ph.D. in ethics and social philosophy from the University of Illinois in
2001. She received her J.D. from the University of California, Boalt Hall School of Law, in 2004.
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Shekoyan v. Sibley Int'l, 409 F.3d 414,417,422 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
Reyes-Gaona v. N.C. Growers Ass'n, 250 F.3d 861,863-64 (4th Cir. 2001).
Denty v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 109 F.3d 147, 148, 151 (3d Cir. 1997).
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Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), all carry extraterritorial
provisions that apply to foreign employers in the United States and to
U.S. employers abroad.4 While federal courts' reluctance to intervene in
each of these cases may seem reasonable taken one at a time, viewed
together in the context of what Thomas Friedman terms the increasingly
"flat" global economy, 5 they suggest that the hard-won prohibitions
against discrimination in this country are at risk. Congress and the courts
are rightly reticent to offend the sovereignty of any nation by regulating
foreign employers in foreign countries. However, this reticence risks
becoming an excuse to avoid grappling with the realities of modern
employment, which include email, outsourcing, a 24-hour global
workday, and a host of economic and technological innovations that
scatter work and employment across time and space in an unprecedented
fashion. Not only are federal courts failing to intervene where they
should, that is, in all workplaces within the territorial United States, but
the legislative branch would be justified in extending the extraterritorial
provisions of antidiscrimination law to protect all employees of U.S.
employers abroad, not just U.S. citizen employees.
Part I of this article traces the contours of employment
discrimination law as it applies outside U.S. borders, with a particular
emphasis on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. It will consider two
landmark Supreme Court cases in this emerging area, the second of
which resulted in the rapid passage of the 1991 amendments that gave
this statute explicit extraterritorial reach.6 With this background, it turns

4. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-I (2000); Americans with
Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(c)(2) (2000); Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29
U.S.C. § 623(h) (2000).
5. THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY passim (1st ed. 2005).
6. The United States has prohibited employers within its territory from discriminating on the
basis of race, sex, national origin, or religion since 1964. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000). Although federal courts enforced rights against such discrimination
abroad, see, e.g., Bryant v. Int'l Sch. Servs., Inc., 502 F. Supp. 472, 483, 492 (D.N.J. 1980), rev'd
on other grounds, 675 F.2d 562 (3d Cir. 1982), it was not until 1984-twenty years later-that
Congress explicitly provided for extraterritorial application of any employment discrimination law,
in that case extending coverage of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C.
§ 623(h); Mary McKlveen Madden, Comment, StrengtheningProtection of Employees at Home and
Abroad: The ExtraterritorialApplication of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, 20 HAMLINE L. REv. 739, 749 (1997). In 1991, Congress
similarly amended Title VII and the ADA. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-66, §
109(b)(1)(B), 105 Stat. 1071, 1077 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l(c)) (amending
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 702, 78 Stat. 253, 255); Civil Rights
Act of 1991 § 109(b)(2)(B) (codified as amended at 42 § U.S.C. 12112(c)(2)) (amending the
Americans with Disabilities Act, Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 102, 104 Stat. 327, 331-33 (1990)). In the
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to the most recent EEOC Enforcement Guidance, which explains the
application of the law and begins to shed light on some of its
implementation. This section closes with some considerations of the
problems that emerge from declining to extend employment
discrimination law under the guise of extraterritorial exclusion.
Part II considers the legality of extending jurisdiction for
employment discrimination protections under international law. It
examines the traditional bases of jurisdiction recognized both under
international law and in U.S. courts. This requires exploration of the act
of state doctrine and principles of comity. While employment
discrimination law may be unprecedented in U.S. law, it does not raise
serious concerns for international law or comity. In fact, international
law would allow the United States to regulate its citizen companies
abroad much more than it currently does. Thus, this section concludes,
worries about judicial intervention into workplaces abroad under Title
VII and other civil rights legislation cannot derive from international law
or comity, though such worries may emerge from ethical and political
convictions rooted in respect for foreign cultures.
Part III examines the ethical and political issues extraterritorial
intervention in the workplace raises. These issues stem in part from the
remedial nature of employment discrimination law and from the troubled
history of the U.S. anti-caste ideal. Recent works by Richard Rorty and
Seyla Benhabib provide two prominent philosophical engagements with
the meanings of foreign equality promotion and respect for foreign
cultures. While the tension between these values raises serious concerns,
these concerns arise in a context where cultural exchange and unequal
power relations are already at work. In this context, a context in which
the person who takes your order at a drive-thru window may be
hundreds of miles away, a context in which your accountant may send
your tax returns to India to be completed while she sleeps, a context in
which more and more immigrants are being recruited for jobs in the
United States, a more robust extraterritorial application of antiyears since, a number of scholars have expressed concern about the legal, political, and ethical
implications of exercising such broad jurisdiction in U.S. courts. See, e.g., Sandra Miller, Note, Reexamining the Role of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Regarding Title Vii's
Foreign Laws Defense, 31 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 439, 454-55 (1998); Meredith
Poznanski Cook, Note, The Extraterritorial Application of Title VII: Does the Foreign Compulsion

Defense Work?, 20 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv 133, 148-53 (1996); Wm. Scott Smith, Comment,
Extraterritorial Application of Title VII and the Americans with Disabilities Act: Have Statute, Will

Travel, 36 S. TEX. L. REv. 191, 216-20 (1995). But see McKlveen Madden, supra, at 759; Sandra
Orihuela & Abigail Montjoy, The Evolution of Latin America's Sexual Harassment Law: A Look at
Mini-Skirts and Multinationals in Peru, 30 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 323, 337, 343-44 (2000).
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discrimination law in employment would mark a positive and important
step forward.
I. EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF TITLE VII

In two landmark decisions, Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v.
Avagliano (Sumitomo),7 in 1988, and EEOC v. Arabian American Oil
(Aramco),8 in 1991, the Supreme Court apparently gave Title VII broad
application against foreign employers operating within U.S. territory 9
and then contained the statute's application entirely within the same
territorial borders. 10 Shortly after the latter decision in 1991, Congress
amended the Civil Rights Act and the ADA to extend extraterritorial
protection to U.S. citizens working for U.S. employers abroad." Perhaps
unfortunately, Congress did not provide courts with much guidance as to
the new provision's application or to its defenses, and there is very little
legislative history on this amendment. 12 The Supreme Court has not
directly confronted the new constellation of extraterritorial employment
discrimination law, much less the new constellation of extraterritorial
employment practices. Until that time comes, the EEOC's Enforcement
Guidance provides the most comprehensive approach to understanding
13
this increasingly important area of civil rights jurisprudence.
This section will review the Supreme Court's decisions in
Sumitomo and Aramco, passage of the 1991 statute, the current EEOC
Guidance, and practical considerations relating to this legal
constellation. This examination will show that foreign employers have
little room to discriminate on otherwise forbidden grounds when they are
operating within the territory of the United States. U.S. and U.S.controlled employers, on the other hand, have free rein to do so in
foreign lands, so long as their victims are not U.S. citizens. While at first
7. 457 U.S. 176 (1982).
8. 499 U.S. 244 (1991).
9. Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 181, 189 (holding that "Sumitomo is not a company of Japan and
thus is not covered" by a treaty exempting Japanese companies from anti-discrimination laws in
upper management).
10. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 246-47, superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No.
102-66, § 109(b)(1)(B), 105 Stat. 1071, 1077 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l(c)(1))
(ruling that Title VII had no extraterritorial application).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (2000); Miller, supra note 6, at 443. The amendment used the same
language as that which extended extraterritorial application to the ADEA. Id.
12. Miller, supra note 6, at 443.
13. Enforcement Guidance on Application of Title V1I and ADA to American Firms Overseas
and to Foreign Firms in the United States, 2 EEOC Comp. Man. (CCH) § 605, 2169, at 2223
(Oct. 20, 1993) [hereinafter EEOC Guidance].
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blush this America-first asymmetry may appear unproblematic, in
practice it has led to a situation in which, for example, employers
operating within the United States may legally discriminate on otherwise
forbidden bases in hiring, so long as their decisions are made abroad and
their applicants are non-U.S. citizens. Foreign employers operating in
the United States may discriminate against U.S. citizens in this way.
Further, the law creates a worrying hierarchy in foreign workplaces
where U.S. citizens maintain more rights against discrimination and
harassment than their local counterparts.
A. Sumitomo, Aramco, and the Civil Rights Act of 1991
In Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano (Sumitomo), the
Supreme Court never reached the merits of the claim that the wholly
owned subsidiary of a Japanese company had hired "only male Japanese
citizens to fill executive, managerial, and sales positions."' 4 Its holding,
in fact, was quite narrow, ruling that the defendant New York
corporation was a domestic corporation for the purposes of applying
Title VII law.' 5 Justice Burger's reasoning, however, has led lower
courts to enforce Title VII broadly against foreign employers operating
in the United States, with narrow exceptions for discrimination in favor
of a home country's nationals. 16
The Court's holding was based on its interpretation of the
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (FCN) Treaty between the
United States and Japan.' 7 The language of the treaty at issue provided
that "[c]ompanies of either Party shall be permitted to engage, within the
territories of the other Party, accountants and other technical experts,
executive personnel, attorneys, agents and other specialists of their
choice."' 8 The Court noted that the United States has FCN treaties with
many other countries, most of which contain similar provisions on which
the United States insisted. '9In a key passage, Burger noted that the
primary purpose of such provisions "was to give corporations of each
signatory legal status in the territory of the other party, and to allow

14. Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 178, 189.
15. Id.at 176.
16. See EEOC Guidance,supra note 13, § 605, 2169, at 2231-32.
17. Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 180, 189 (discussing Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and
Navigation, U.S.-Japan, art. V111(1), Apr. 2, 1953,4 U.S.T.2063).
18. Id. at 181 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation,
U.S.-Japan, art. VI1I(I), Apr. 2, 1953, 4 U.S.T. 2063).
19. Id. at 181 n.6.
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them to conduct business . . . on a comparable basis with domestic
firms. ' 20 To do that, the parties had to address the fact that their
corporations had no legal existence outside the country of their
incorporation. 21 By allowing each other's nationals to create domestic
corporations in their territories, the parties did not "give foreign
corporations greater rights than domestic companies, but instead
[assured] them the right to conduct business on an equal basis. 2 Burger
insisted that this conclusion did not rule out the possibility that branches
(incorporated in foreign countries) would have greater rights than
subsidiaries (incorporated within U.S. territory), but such rights would
only be those "conferred by [treaty]. ''23 Since the question of which
rights those might be was not at issue, Burger never spelled them out.
His reasoning would suggest that the rights conferred by the FCN Treaty
provisions would, at most, confer on foreign branches a negative right
against discrimination on the basis of their being foreign. 24 This reading,
however, has not carried the day. 5
In EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co. (Aramco), the Supreme
Court held that Title VII did not apply to any workplace abroad.26 In
Aramco, Mr. Boureslan, a U.S. citizen, had been employed by two U.S.
companies, one located in Saudi Arabia.27 He claimed to have been
harassed and ultimately discharged on the basis of his race, religion, and
national origin. 28 In denying that federal courts had subject-matter
jurisdiction to hear such claims, Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion
29
relied particularly on Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo
and Benz v.
3
0
Compania Naviera Hidalgo to support the idea that although Congress
has the power to legislate beyond U.S. borders, courts must assume its

20. Id. at 186.
21.
22.

Id.at 182, 186.
Id. at 187-88.

23. Id. at 189.
24.
25.

Id. at 188.
See, e.g., Fortino v. Quasar Co., 950 F.2d 389, 391-93 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that the

FCN Treaty with Japan confers a right on a domestic but wholly owned subsidiary of a Japanese
company to discriminate in favor of Japanese citizens). But see EEOC Guidance, supra note 13, §
605, 2169, at 2231-32.
26. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 246-47 (1991); see also Miller, supra note

6, at 441-42 (discussing Aramco, 499 U.S. at 246); Poznanski Cook, supra note 6, at 137
(discussing Aramco, 499 U.S. at 258-59).
27. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 247.

28.

Id.

29.
30.

336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949).
353 U.S. 138, 147 (1957).
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targets are domestic unless it makes an extraterritorial intention clear.3'
The petitioners and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) argued that because the statute explicitly excluded "aliens
[employed] outside any State" from protection, the statute must have
been intended to apply abroad.32 The Court found this evidence to be
insufficient, partly because the alien exemption provision could be read
to extend coverage to employers in U.S. territories, which are not states,
and partly because it read "employer" not to be limited to U.S.
employers.3 3 Thus, the Court reasoned, allowing this petitioner's claim
to survive summary judgment would invite suit by any U.S. citizen
employee against any employer in the world. 3
The Court did not defer to the EEOC's interpretation of the law
because it found the EEOC interpretation did not meet the standards set
out in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert.35 Under Gilbert, the EEOC is
entitled to deference based on the thoroughness of its interpretation, its
logical validity, its consistency over time, and on "all those factors
which give it power to persuade., 36 The EEOC's guidelines failed to
incorporate extraterritorial application until twenty-four years after the
statute's enactment, and the Court did not find this interpretation to be
supported by the statute's plain language.3 7 Ultimately, as it denied
jurisdiction, the Court invited Congress to amend Title VII.38
Congress was quick to respond to the Court's invitation. Within
months, it effectively overruled Aramco, extending both Title VII and
the ADA to foreign contexts. Section 109 of the 1991 Civil Rights Act
broadens the term employee to include citizens employed abroad: "With
respect to employment in a foreign country, such term includes an
31. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248. But see id. at 262-65 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting that the
Foley Bros. decision took account of the entire "scheme of the Act" and did not require a clear
statement of Congressional intent, and that Benz and other cases requiring a clear statement are
concerned with extraterritorial application to non-U.S. citizens, which raises more serious issues of
international comity).
32. Id. at 253 (majority opinion).
33. See id. at 253-55 (discussing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-I),
34. See id. at 255 (stating that if the statute applied to employers overseas, "a French
employer of a United States citizen in France would be subject to Title VII - a result at which even
petitioners balk").
35. 429 U.S. 125 (1976), cited in Aramco, 499 U.S. at 257. The EEOC is not entitled to
Chevron deference since Congress never enabled it to promulgate binding regulations. See id. at
141, cited in Aramco, 499 U.S. at 257; cf Regulations of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 701
(2000). See generally Chevron v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 844-45 (1984).
36. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 141-42 (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)),
cited in Aramco, 499 U.S. at 257.
37. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 257-58.
38. Id. at 258-59.
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individual who is a citizen of the United States. 39 It protects employees
so long as they are employed by U.S. employers or U.S. employercontrolled employers. 40 The new section also identifies several factors
for determining whether an employer is U.S. employer-controlled:
interrelation of operations, common management, centralized control of
labor relations, and common ownership or financial control of the
employer and the corporation. 4' It allows employers an exemption if
compliance with Title VII or the ADA "would cause [an employer] to
violate the
law of the foreign country in which such workplace is
42
located.
B. The EEOC Enforcement Guidance
The current EEOC Enforcement Guidance (the Guidance) offers
direction to EEOC officers in Title VII enforcement both with regard to
the liability of foreign employers for discrimination that occurs within
U.S. territory and with regard to the liability of U.S. employers and U.S.
employer-controlled employers for discrimination that occurs abroad.43
The Guidance begins by reviewing the history of the Aramco decision
and the 1991 amendments to Title VII. 44 It reminds its officers that
although aliens working outside the United States are excluded from
coverage, aliens working inside the United States are protected.45 As
39. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 109(a), 105 Stat. 1071, 1077-78
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (2000)) (amending Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 701(0, 78 Stat. 253, 255); Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 109(a) (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12111(4)) (amending Americans with Disabilities Act, Pub. L. No. 101336, § 101(4), 104 Stat. 327, 330 (1990)).
40. Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 109(b)(l)(B) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e1(c)(1)-(c)(2)) (amending Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 702(c)(1)-(2)); Civil Rights Act of 1991 §
109(b)(2)(B) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12112(c)(2)(A)-(B)) (amending Americans with
Disabilities Act § 102(c)(2)(A)-(B)).
41. Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 109(b)(1)(B) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e1(c)(3)) (amending Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 702(c)(3)); Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 109(b)(2)(B)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12112(c)(2)(C)) (amending Americans with Disabilities Act §
102(c)(2)(C)).
42. Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 109(b)(1)(B) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l(b))
(amending Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 702(b)); Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 109(b)(2)(B) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12112(c)(1)) (amending Americans with Disabilities Act § 102(c)(1)). This
language mirrors the extraterritorial provisions of the ADEA. Age Discrimination in Employment
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(1) (2000).
43. EEOC Guidance,supra note 13, § 605, 2169, at 2223.
44. Id. at 2223-24.
45. Id. at 2224 n.2 (citing Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 95 (1973)). Although the
ADA does not contain a similar exclusion of aliens employed abroad, the Guidance takes the
position that "the standards governing coverage of aliens [working inside the United States] are the
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noted above, EEOC guidelines do not bind federal courts; however, their
interpretations are accorded persuasive deference.46
1. Foreign Employers in Domestic Workplaces
According to the Guidance, "[i]t is well settled that, absent
constraints imposed by treaty or by binding international agreement,
Title VII applies to a foreign employer when it discriminates within the
United States. 4 7 This is justified by the same reasoning as personal
jurisdiction generally: If the employer availed itself of the benefits of
U.S. laws, it can reasonably expect that it could be held accountable
under those laws.48 So, the bulk of the Guidance's discussion focuses on
the exception for treaties. It notes that Friendship Commerce and
Navigation (FCN) treaties are likely to be invoked as a defense. 49 The
Guidance advises its officers to determine: "(1) whether the respondent
is protected by the treaty; (2) if so, whether the employment practices at
issue are covered by the treaty; and (3) if so, the impact of the treaty on
the application of Title VII." 5 °
Regarding the first determination, the Commission asserts that
under Sumitomo, only companies incorporated in Japan are entitled to
the protection of the FCN Treaty with Japan. 5' It further notes that in
that decision, the Supreme Court did not interpret other FCN treaties and
different negotiating histories and texts might lead to different
conclusions. 52 It acknowledges the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of
Sumitomo, that it remains an open question as to whether a U.S.
subsidiary may invoke its parent company's rights under the Treaty
when its discrimination was dictated by that parent. 53 On the Seventh
Circuit's reading, the Treaty confers a right to discriminate in favor of
the home country's citizens if the parent dictated the discrimination in
same under both the ADA and Title ViI." Id.
46. See supra Part L.A (discussing EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991)); Gen.
Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134,
140 (1944)).
47. EEOC Guidance,supra note 13, § 605,

2169, at 2229-30.

48. Id. at 2230; see also Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945) (holding that
a corporation that exercises the privileges of conducting business within a state is also subject to any
obligations within that state).
49. See, e.g., Papaila v. Uniden Am. Corp., 51 F.3d 54, 56 (5th Cir. 1995) (allowing treaty
defense).
50. EEOC Guidance,supra note 13, §605, 2169, at 2230.
51. Id. at 2231.
52. Id. (citing Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. at 176, 185 n.12).
53. Id. (citing Fortino v. Quasar Co., 950 F.2d 389, 393 (7th Cir. 1991)).
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question.54 The Guidance rejects this reading, invoking instead the Fifth
Circuit's opinion that subsidiaries may not invoke the parent company's
rights, since to do so would allow them to circumvent the holding in
Sumitomo. 55 Thus, the EEOC applies this standard to subsidiaries of
Japanese companies outside the Seventh Circuit.
Regarding the second and third determinations of whether the
conduct at issue is covered by a treaty and what the treaty's impact is on
the application of Title VII, the Commission reiterates the point that this
determination will depend on the facts of the conduct at issue and the
language and intent of the treaty.56 It notes in the Guidance that "[m]ost
courts construing the scope of particular FCN treaties have further
determined that the protection they extend is only the right of foreign
companies covered by the treaty to prefer citizens of their own countries
for executive, management, and other identified positions. 5 7 This
suggests that FCN treaties typically assert a very narrow privilege to
foreign companies to discriminate within the United States in favor of
their home country's citizens. In other words, a Japanese company
operating in the United States may have a right to prefer Japanese
nationals in its executive positions, but the treaty does not confer a right
to prefer the nationals of any other country. As noted above, the Seventh
Circuit extends these treaty rights to U.S. subsidiaries of foreign
companies.58 Further, the Seventh Circuit, unlike other circuits, suggests
that an FCN treaty may confer "blanket immunity" on foreign or
foreign-controlled companies. 59 The Commission flatly rejects this
notion that such treaties confer a right "to ' prefer
people on bases
60
ADEA.
the
or
ADA
the
VII,
prohibited by Title
To sum up, the EEOC Enforcement Guidance finds a certain
amount of tension in the law with respect to foreign employers operating
domestic workplaces. Title VII applies to all U.S. companies operating
within the United States. It applies equally to foreign corporations when
they do business in U.S. territory, with exceptions as provided by treaty.
Such exceptions may allow for discrimination in favor of a home
country's nationals, and they may or may not extend to U.S.

54. Fortino,950 F.2dat 393.
55. EEOC Guidance, supra note 13, § 605,
725 F.2d 970, 973 (5th Cir. 1984).

2169, at 2231 (citing Spiess v. C. ltoh & Co.,

56. Id. at 2232.
57. Id. at 2233.
58.

Id. at 2231 (citing Fortino,950 F.2d at 393).

59.
60.

See id. at 2231, 2233.
Id. at 2233 n.19.
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corporations that are controlled by a foreign parent. The EEOC rejects
the idea that treaties might allow discrimination on otherwise forbidden
bases such as national origin, religion or gender, noting that some courts
have expressly left the question of such blanket immunity open.
2. Domestic Employers Abroad
The current Enforcement Guidance also directs its investigators and
officers on how to approach claims alleging discriminatory conduct
abroad.
Assessing the nationality of employers is key to determining
whether Title VII applies in a foreign workplace. Of course, if an61
employer is incorporated in the United States, the act applies.
However, the Commission says U.S. nationality may be determined by
other factors having to do with "the totality of that company's contacts
with the United States. 62 These include "the company's principle place
of business, . . . the nationality of dominant shareholders and/or those
holding voting control . . . and . . .the nationality and location of

management., 63 Thus, a company that is incorporated abroad, but does
its primary business in the United States, will be considered a U.S.
national for the purposes of Title VII when an employee in a foreign
office brings suit.64
Application of Title VII is more complicated when the charged
employer is considered a foreign national under the act. Such a
company's employment practices will be subject to liability if it is
controlled by a U.S. employer.65 Factors for determining such control are
specified in the act, and they are the same as those used for determining
whether two or more companies can be considered an "integrated
enterprise" in the domestic setting. 66 Thus, "[a] foreign entity will be
found to be controlled only if it is, in effect, an integrated enterprise with
an American employer., 67 Factors to consider include the interrelation of

61. Id. at 2225 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 213 (1987); id. reporters' note 5).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See id. Naturally, the charged party must also be an employer within the meaning of Title
VII: It must be "engaged in an industry affecting commerce and must employ 15 or more employees
in each of twenty weeks in the current or preceding calendar year." Id. at 2225 n.5 (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(b) (2000)).
65. Id.at 2226.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 2226 n.6.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2007

11

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 24, Iss. 2 [2007], Art. 4
HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LA WJOURNAL

306

[Vol. 24:295

operations, common management, centralized control of labor relations,
and common ownership or financial control of the two entities. 68 The
Commission notes that no single factor is dispositive, not even a finding
that a foreign employer is the wholly owned subsidiary of a U.S.
company. 69 Thus, it is entirely possible that a U.S.-owned foreign
subsidiary or multinational enterprise may not be subject to U.S. civil
rights law. If, after this fact-intensive inquiry, an employer is found to be
controlled by a U.S. company, the Commission recommends its officers
charge both companies with the violation. 70
An employer obligated to abide by civil rights law abroad may
invoke the so-called foreign laws defense to escape liability.71 The
EEOC applies the same foreign laws defense test under the ADA, Title
VII, and the ADEA.72 To establish this defense, the employer must
prove three elements: "(1) the action is taken with respect to an
employee in a workplace in a foreign country, where (2) compliance
with Title VII or the ADA would cause the respondent to violate the law
of the foreign country, (3) in which the workplace is located., 73 The first
and third elements are at least theoretically straightforward: The first
element excludes application of the defense when the workplace is
located in U.S. territories or states.74 The third element excludes
application of the defense on the basis of the laws of any other country
than that of the workplace; for example, it excludes the country where a
company's headquarters are located or where it is incorporated "unless
the charging party's workplace is also located in that country. 7 5 These
first and third elements will be more or less established in the process of
bringing a case; thus, the second element requires the most serious
scrutiny for the purposes of adjudicating this defense.
The Guidance breaks the second element into two parts: the
employer must prove that a law exists and that compliance with Title VII
68.

Id. at 2226 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-I (c)(3) (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 12112(c)(2)(C) (2000)).

69.

Id.

70.

Id. at 2227 n.8.

71. For its discussion of the foreign laws defense, the Guidance refers to "employer[s]," but
notes that the exact same defense is available to other entities covered under Title VII such as
employment agencies and labor organizations. Id at 2227 n.9; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)-(d)
(2000) (defining employer, employment agency, and labor organization).
72.

See EEOC Guidance, supra note 13, § 605,

2169, at 2227-28. It also notes that

"respondents may assert in some cases that obligations imposed by international treaty dictated their
discriminatory conduct abroad." Id. at 2227 n.9. The Guidance instructs its attorneys to contact the
Attorney of the Day, who will then contact the Department of State, in such cases. Id.
73.
74.

Id. at 2227.
See id. at 2228.

75. Id. at 2229.
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would "cause" a violation of that law.7 6 What constitutes a "law" for the
purposes of this defense is "uncertain., 7 7 Borrowing from Mahoney v.
RFE/RL, Inc., 78 an ADEA case, the Guidance suggests that neither union
contracts nor foreign court decisions enforcing such contracts are "law"
for the purposes of Title VII. 79 In Mahoney, the D.C. District Court
noted that the mandatory retirement provision of the union contract at
issue "had not been mandated by the German government and did not
have general applicability beyond the parties to the contract." 80 The
Guidance approvingly notes the court's reasoning that overseas
employers could easily avoid application of such remedial statutes by
embedding such provisions in its contracts. 8' This would allow the
exception to swallow the rule. 82 The Mahoney court also noted the
remedial nature of the ADEA and therefore construed the foreign
exception narrowly, excluding foreign practices and policies from
"law. ,83 The Guidance notes pre-amendment cases where courts have
held that "various gleaned impressions to the effect that the Saudis did
84
not want any Jews in their country" did not satisfy a Title VII defense,
and neither did "stereotypes that South American clients would refuse to
deal with female executive[s].,, 85 Thus, the "law" a defendant may
invoke under Title VII must be generally applicable, mandated by
government, and probably explicitly codified.86
To succeed in a foreign laws defense, the employer must not only
prove that a law exists in the country of operation, but also that
compliance with Title VII would "cause" it to be violated.87 The
Guidance interprets this requirement to mean that "it is impossible to
comply with both sets of requirements," or that compliance with Title

76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 2228.
Id.
818 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1992).
EEOC Guidance, supra note 13, § 605,

2169, at 2228 (citing Mahoney, 818 F. Supp. at

3-4).
80. Id. (citing Mahoney, 818 F. Supp. at 3-4).
81. Id. (citing Mahoney, 818 F. Supp. at 5).
82. Id. (citing Mahoney, 818 F. Supp. at 5).
83. Id. (citing Mahoney, 818 F. Supp. at 3).
84. Id. at 2228 n.12 (citing Abrams v. Baylor Coll. ofMed., 581 F. Supp. 1570, 1576-77 (S.D.
Tex. 1984), affd in relevantpart, 805 F.2d 528 (5th Cir. 1986)).
85. Id. (citing Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273, 1276-77 (9th Cir. 1981)).
86. The foreign laws defense may also be a subset of the older Title VII defense that
discrimination may be justified if identity status is a bona fide occupational qualification. See 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (2000).
87. EEOC Guidance, supra note 13, § 605, 2169, at 2229.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2007

13

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 24, Iss. 2 [2007], Art. 4
HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LA W JOURNAL

308

[Vol. 24:295

VII would make violation of the foreign law inevitable.8 8 Investigators
are instructed to gather all relevant documentary material available,
including the statute itself, case law, and legislative history. 89 They
should also consider what steps the defendant might have taken to avoid
the conflict or comply with Title VII. 90 As an example of a successful
defense, the Guidance notes another pre-amendment Title VII case in
which a defendant was not held liable for "requiring helicopter pilots it
employed in Saudi Arabia to convert to [the] Moslem religion where
Saudi Arabian law provided for beheading of non-Moslems who" flew
over Mecca. 91 As an example of a failed defense, the Guidance
hypothesizes a law that mandates six weeks of childcare leave for female
employees after pregnancy. 92 Compliance with both Title VII and such a
law would require that the company give the same six weeks to its male
employees. Since both laws could be simultaneously obeyed, no foreign
law defense would be available to a company that only obeyed the local
law. "
In sum, the EEOC finds room for uncertainty in the law as it applies
to foreign workplaces. Title VII applies to U.S. companies doing
business abroad. Companies not incorporated in the United States may
also be subject to Title VII regulation abroad. The totality of a
company's contacts with the United States may qualify it as a U.S.
national. Or, a foreign national may be brought under the statute's
umbrella by its integration with a U.S. enterprise. In either case, such a
company may invoke foreign laws as a defense to liability. What
constitutes a law under this defense remains uncertain, though it
probably requires a generally applicable and explicitly codified
government mandate. To succeed as a defense, the EEOC requires that
such a law inevitably conflict with Title VII.
C. Some Difficulties in Application
Although the EEOC's Guidance sheds light on the significance of
Title VII's extraterritorial reach, much of the law's application remains

88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. (citing Kern v. Dynalectron Corp., 577 F. Supp. 1196, 1200, 1203 (N.D. Tex. 1983)
(finding the requirement to be a bona fide occupational qualification), affd, 746 F.2d 810 (5th Cir.
1984)).

92. Id.
93.

Id.
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uncertain. Such uncertainty is to be expected, since applying the act in
extraterritorial contexts cannot happen all at once. It will arrive in
federal courts in a necessarily piecemeal fashion, as individuals bring
complaints in the various forms authorized by the Byzantine structure of
Title VII and its jurisprudence. This section will consider problems
arising from claims in the context of hiring, promotion, and firing to
illustrate that an inconsistent, patchwork approach to Title VII
enforcement abroad risks undermining the goals of anti-discrimination
law in both foreign and domestic workplaces.
Title VII prohibits discrimination in hiring within the United States,
unless there is a treaty exemption, and it prohibits discrimination against
U.S. citizens if committed by U.S. employers or U.S. employercontrolled employers abroad, unless there is an inescapable conflict with
local law. 94 Does this mean that a U.S. employer may discriminate in
hiring for its domestic workplace so long as it goes abroad to hire aliens?
Such was the conclusion of the Fourth Circuit in Reyes-Gaona v. North
Carolina Growers Ass 'n in its application of the ADEA. 95 Does it mean
that foreign companies abroad may discriminate in promoting U.S.
citizens working in the United States as long as the promotion involves a
workplace abroad? Such was the reasoning of the Third Circuit in Denty
v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., applying the same statute. 96 Does it mean
a U.S. company can legally discriminate against a legal permanent
resident hired in the United States and then sent abroad to fulfill a
federal government contract? So the D.C. 97
Circuit concluded in Shekoyan
v. Sibley International,applying Title VII.
In North Carolina Growers, Luis Reyes-Gaona, a Mexican citizen
residing in Mexico, asked a recruiter for the North Carolina Growers
Association (NCGA) to put his name on a list for agricultural jobs in
North Carolina.98 After he was told that NCGA did not hire workers over
forty who had not worked for them before, he filed an age discrimination
claim. 99 The Fourth Circuit dismissed the claim on grounds that the
ADEA does not protect foreign employees in foreign countries who
apply for jobs in the United States.100 In this case, the nationality of the
employer and the location of the work site did not matter, only the

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 2229-30; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l(b) (2000).
250 F.3d 861, 866-67 (4th Cir. 2001).
109 F.3d 147, 150, 151 (3dCir. 1997).
409 F.3d 414, 417,422 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
NC. Growers, 250 F.3d at 863.
Id.
Id.
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nationality of the employee and the locus of the discriminatory act.
In SmithKline Beecham, Garland Denty, a U.S. citizen, had been
Director of Quality Assurance in the United States for the Pennsylvania
corporation of Smith Kline French.' 01 That company later merged with a
larger British company, Beecham, in 1989.102 Though Denty had been
promoted in the past, after the merger, he was passed over for
promotions that would have taken him abroad. 10 3 The Third Circuit
dismissed his age discrimination claim on the ground that the ADEA did
not cover the decisions of foreign employers concerning jobs in foreign
countries, even if the applicant was a U.S. national in the United
States. 104 In this case, the location and the nationality of the employee
did not matter, only the nationality of the employer and the location of
the future rather than current work site. 105
In Sibley International, Vladimir Shekoyan, a legal permanent
resident of the United States, was hired by Sibley International in the
District of Columbia. 106 He signed an employment contract there to work
in Tbilisi, in the Republic of Georgia, as a training advisor under a
contract between Sibley and U.S.A.I.D. 107 Sibley later terminated
Shekoyan's employment by sending a letter to his home in D.C. stating
that their staffing requirements had changed. 108 Shekoyan believed he
was fired because he had complained to his superiors in D.C. about
harassment by his supervisor in Georgia based on his national origin and
about financial misconduct by the same supervisor.'0 9 The D.C. Circuit
upheld the trial court's dismissal of Shekoyan's Title VII claim based on
findings that the workplace was abroad and that Shekoyan was not a
U.S. citizen." 0 In this case, the location of the workplace and the
citizenship of the employee were sufficient to defeat jurisdiction,
notwithstanding the locus of at least one discriminatory act and the
nationality of the employer."'
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

SmithKline Beecham, 109 F.3d at 148.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 148-49.
Id. at 151.
Shekoyan v. Sibley Int'l, 409 F.3d 414,417 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
Id.
Id.
Id. at418.
Id. at 421-22.

111. It's worthy to note that Shekoyan, as a legal permanent resident, asserted that he was a
U.S. national for the purposes of applying Title VII abroad. Id. at 421. The D.C. Circuit did not
address this issue, since the extraterritorial provisions of Title VII only protect U.S. citizens. Id. at
421-22.
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From these three cases, it seems there are four grounds for finding
extraterritoriality and potentially for rejecting jurisdiction: nationality of
the employer, citizenship of the employee, location of the workplace,
and location of the discriminatory act. The first three are anticipated by
the 1991 amendments to Title VII and the ADA and by the mirror
provisions of the ADEA. The fourth is not. The introduction of this
fourth factor, most notably in North Carolina Growers,"2 threatens to
crack civil rights protections in employment wide open.
Following the logic of North Carolina Growers and SmithKline
Beecham, one might conclude that the locus of a discriminatory act
alone is sufficient for determining whether an application of civil rights
law is extraterritorial. On this reasoning, though, it would be legal for a
U.S. employer to transfer a legal permanent resident from an office in
the United States to a foreign office for the purpose of discharging,
discriminating against or harassing that alien in a manner that would
otherwise violate Title VII." 3 Similarly, a foreign employer could do the
same to a U.S. citizen. Following this reasoning strictly would suggest
that a U.S. employer could discriminate against its alien employees
working in the United States, so long as it left the country to so act, and
that a foreign employer could do the same against U.S. citizen
employees in the United States. This is a particularly disturbing
possibility when one recalls that U.S.-owned multinationals may be
foreign for the purposes of Title VII. 114
Fortunately, the D.C. Circuit's decision in Sibley International
clarifies that the location of the discriminatory act is not the only factor
for determining extraterritoriality and may even be dismissed outright." 5
Perhaps unfortunately, by dismissing outright a discriminatory act
committed within the United States, Sibley Internationalmight be taken
together with North Carolina Growers to stand for the proposition that
the location of a discriminatory act cannot be used to establish
jurisdiction but only to defeat it. This is unfortunate when one recalls
that civil rights legislation is remedial, meaning it should be given wide
effect within the United States, regardless of the fact that this remedial

112. Reyes-Gaona v. N.C. Growers Ass'n, 250 F.3d 861, 866 (4th Cir. 2001).
113. See McKIveen Madden, supra note 6, at 752 (explaining loopholes that U.S. companies
operating abroad can use to exempt themselves from Title VII).
114. See EEOC Guidance, supranote 13, § 605, 2169, at 2225.
115. See Sibley Int'l, 409 F.3d at 420-22 (dismissing the plaintiffs Title VII claims on grounds
that he was not a U.S. citizen and that he was employed in a foreign country without addressing the
location of the discriminatory act, even though the plaintiff received his termination letter at his
D.C. residence and many decisions concerning his employment were made in the United States).
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purpose may be in tension with the countervailing constructive principle
of narrowly reading its extraterritorial reach. In any event, Sibley
International makes it extremely difficult to formulate a rule that
consistently takes account of the facts in all three cases.
If courts follow North Carolina Growers while taking account of
Sibley International's position that the locus of a discriminatory act
alone is not sufficient to settle the question of jurisdiction,
extraterritoriality could be determined by both the location of the
discriminatory act and the location of the employee at the time of the act,
regardless of the location of the workplace. Logically, this result would
be in tension with the denial of extraterritorial liability in both
SmithKline Beecham, where a U.S. citizen in the United States was
denied a job at a foreign workplace by a foreign employer, and Sibley
International,where a foreign citizen was discriminated against locally
by a foreign company regarding a foreign workplace. In effect, were the
reasoning in North Carolina Growers taken as a general rule, any U.S.
citizen applying for jobs abroad might be able to invoke protection under
Title VII against any foreign employer, so long as the potential foreign
employers came to the United States to hire them. While such a proviso
might seem to inoculate most foreign employers, recall that it could
prove almost meaningless in light of recent technological advances in
communications such as teleconferencing and email. Thus, U.S. citizens
would be authorized to bring suits against foreign companies in foreign
lands regarding foreign workplaces, but non-citizens would not be
protected against U.S. companies operating in the United States from
discrimination carried out abroad. This result blatantly conflicts with the
statute's explicit exclusion of regulating foreign employers abroad and it
further undermines the rights of aliens currently protected under civil
rights law within U.S. territory.
If courts were to accept the importance of workplace location as
expressed in both SmithKline Beecham and Sibley International,
rejecting the reasoning of North Carolina Growers, extraterritorial
liability could instead depend on the employer's nationality, the
employee's nationality, and the workplace location.11 6 This elegant
solution more closely reflects the language of the 1991 Amendments to
the Civil Rights Act. It would not open the door significantly to foreign
employer regulation, although it could mean a broader scope for
domestic employer liability, at least with respect to foreign recruiting. It
116. This was part of the argument the EEOC presented in North Carolina Growers, 250 F.3d
at 865-66.
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would not, however, broaden the law to the point that all non-U.S.
citizens would be protected against U.S. employer discrimination in
workplaces abroad, even when they are hired and discriminated against
in this country.
Interpreting the law as regulating all U.S. workplaces, including
those within U.S. territory, would enhance its coherency by eliminating
the apparent extraterritorial loophole created by North Carolina
Growers. However, the law's application would remain uneven in U.S.
workplaces abroad.
As the law is currently written, U.S. citizens in U.S. workplaces
abroad have significantly more protection against discrimination and
harassment than their non-U.S. colleagues. This is to say that U.S.
employers abroad retain the right to discriminate against and harass the
locals, wherever local law allows. Further, even if such harassment or
discrimination is illegal in the host country, foreign employees of U.S.
employers abroad do not have the right to pursue claims in U.S. courts.
While allowing non-citizens to bring suit against these employers may
give rise to separate problems, especially in light of the remedies also
created under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, it is not obvious why in
principle the U.S. government should want its citizens to retain the right
to discriminate abroad on grounds forbidden at home.
D. An UncertainFuture
Congress trod a narrow line in amending Title VII as part of the
Civil Rights Act of 1991. To extend protection and responsibility to its
citizen employers and employees without disrupting the laws of other
countries, the new provisions create an uneven legal system where
anything involving foreign companies, foreign citizens, or foreign
actions leaves workers' civil rights and employers' obligations on
quaking, shifting ground (uncomfortably shifting sands). To avoid
interference between foreign nationals and foreign nations, and perhaps
following the Supreme Court's lead in Aramco, U.S. courts have been
wary
of extending
employment
discrimination
protection
extraterritorially. In the context of an increasingly global labor market
and an increasingly multi-national corporate structure, such hesitation
threatens to allow discrimination protections to fall through the cracks
between domestic and foreign U.S.-workplace regulation. Most of this
slippage could be avoided through a consistent and forthright application
of the law to all workplaces within U.S. territory. However, troubling
cases like Sibley Internationalsuggest that a system that does not extend
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protection to alien employees abroad when they are employed by U.S. or
U.S.-controlled companies may encourage outsourcing discrimination
nonetheless.
II. TITLE VII UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW

The difficulties in applying Title VII abroad most emphatically do
not stem from its ultimate incompatibility with international law. This
section will consider the traditional bases of sovereign prescriptive
jurisdiction, noting that expanded employment discrimination
jurisdiction is unique but not immodest against the background of
existing international and U.S. legal practice. It will further consider the
act of state doctrine, principles of comity, and separation of powers
concerns as they arise in U.S. courts together with the extent to which
treaty and foreign laws defenses may address them.
A. PrescriptiveJurisdiction
Under international law, sovereign states traditionally have
uncontroversial prescriptive jurisdiction on the bases of territory and
nationality. 1 17 That is, a state may assert jurisdiction for any act in its
territory or for any effect of an act in its territory.1 1 8 Further, it may try
its own nationals for acts committed abroad, regardless of the nationality
of the person injured. 1 9 So, the extraterritorial provisions in the
employment discrimination area do not obviously provoke strong
objections from an international legal perspective. The United States is
completely within its rights to regulate employment within its borders as
well as the behavior of its nationals outside its borders. In fact, Congress
has done so in the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, prohibiting bribery as
a means to doing business abroad, however efficacious. "0
Despite its legality, federal courts have applied the principle of
extraterritorial jurisdiction on the basis of nationality only in the context
117.

See PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST'S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW

110-11 (7th rev. ed., Routledge 1997) (1970). A third basis, "passive nationality principle"
jurisdiction, which is based on the nationality of the victim of a crime, is much more controversial.
See id. at Il l.
118.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §

402(l)(a), (l)(c) (1987); MALANCZUK, supra note 117, at 110-11.
119.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS

LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §

402(2); MALANCZUK, supra note 117, at I l.
120. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, sec. 103(a), § 30A, sec. 104,
91 Stat. 1494, 1495-98 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-I to dd-2 (1994 & Supp. 2006)).
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of criminal law. 121 Subject-matter jurisdiction over private international
disputes typically depends on the internationally recognized principle of
freedom to contract. Therefore, when federal courts apply U.S. law (or
more commonly, when private arbitrators apply U.S. law) to foreign or
U.S. businesses, it is generally because the businesses have acceded to
such jurisdiction in advance. While employment rights might be
enforced by contract, for example, where employees are unionized, Title
VII aims to set a floor for employment practice. Its application is most
important where employees do not have such protection. This type of
protection logically falls somewhere between private law in the form of
contract law and public criminal law, both of which are currently
enforced by federal courts in extraterritorial contexts.
Antitrust law may be the best analogue to civil rights legislation,
since it provides a kind of hybrid precedent in that the Sherman AntiTrust Act 122 provides for either criminal or civil sanctions. 12 3 Though the
first Supreme Court decision on point, American Banana Co. v. United
Fruit Co.,1 24 denied extraterritorial reach to the Sherman Act, later cases

throughout the twentieth century have limited that case to its facts. 125
Learned Hand's celebrated opinion in United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America (Alcoa) asserts that U.S. courts addressing extraterritoriality
must ask "whether Congress intended to impose the liability, and
whether our own Constitution permitted it to do so.' ' 126 Nevertheless, the
opinion continues: "We should not impute to Congress an intent to
punish all whom its courts can catch, for conduct which has no

121.

See MALANCZUK, supra note 117, at 110-11 (noting that European civil law countries use

the rule extensively).
122.

15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).

123. Id. §§ 1-4 (deeming contracts and monopolies in restraint of trade both a felony and
subject to proceedings in equity by the Attorney General). Like the Department of Justice in
antitrust violations, the EEOC may bring "Commissioner's charges" against an employer absent an
individual employee complaint. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (2000). Although it is extremely unlikely
that the EEOC would ever do this in a transnational context, it is a theoretical possibility.
124. 213 U.S. 347 (1909). In this case, a U.S. plantation owner sued a competitor for violation
of the Sherman Act. Id. at 353-54. The Court declined to pass judgment in this case, since to do so

would require it to judge an act of state, namely Costa Rica's decision to seize the plaintiffs land.
Id. at 356-59; see also ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION
72 (2d ed. 2002) (stating that in American Banana the complaint "would have required an
adjudication of the legality of the Costa Rican seizure, an action which the Supreme Court said our
courts could not challenge"); infra text accompanying notes 133-39 (discussing the "act of state"

doctrine).
125. LOWENFELD, supra note 124, at 73 (citing Cont'l Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon
Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 704-05 (1962); United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268, 275-76
(1927); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443-44 (2d Cir. 1945)).
126. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 443.
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consequences within the United States."' 12 7 Consistent with Alcoa,
antitrust law bases extraterritorial
jurisdiction on the regulated conduct's
128
effects within U.S. territory.
Despite this historic limitation of public civil law to territory,
federal courts have recently begun to enforce international human rights
law under a theory of universal jurisdiction. 29 The cases arising under
the Alien Tort Claims Act and the Torture Victim Protection Act bring
foreign nationals to U.S. courts to answer for human rights violations
against other foreign nationals abroad. 130 Recently, there have been
several such cases in federal courts where the complainants accused U.S.
and other multinational corporations of complicity in extraterritorial
human rights violations. 131 Several other democracies invoke universal
jurisdiction for the most heinous international crimes, including some
crimes U.S. courts shy away from adjudicating. 32 Thus, in the context of
both international and domestic law, the extraterritorial provisions of
Title VII and other civil rights laws are rather modest.
127. Id. (citing Am. Banana, 213 U.S. at 443).
128. See, e.g., United States v. LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d 672, 679 (9th Cir. 2004)
(quoting Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 (1993)); In re Uranium Antitrust
Litig., 617 F.2d 1248, 1253 (7th Cir. 1980) (citing Cont'l Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon
Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 705 (1962)); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287,
1292 (3d Cir. 1979); United States v. Watchmakers of Switz. Info. Ctr., Inc., No. Civ. 96-170, 1965
WL 93249, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y Jan. 7, 1965); Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Distillers Co., 395 F.
Supp. 221, 227 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)).
129. See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that an alien
within U.S. borders is subject to federal jurisdiction for perpetuating acts of torture in violation of
the international law of human rights); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 236 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding
that subject matter jurisdiction in federal court exists where the defendant may be found liable for
genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity); see Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 28
U.S.C. § 1350 (2000). The Filartigadecision was controversial because § 1350 does not expressly
refer to human rights, and its enactment predates that language as a part of international law. Id.; see
Filartiga,630 F.2d at 878.
130. 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
131. Recent cases include: an allegation of forced labor, Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 110 F.2d 1294,
1299 (C.D. Cal. 2000), vacated, 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005); an allegation of using paramilitaries
inside a bottling plant to murder, torture and unlawfully detain trade unionists in an effort to squash
the union, Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1350 (S.D. Fla. 2003); and an
allegation that a variety of human rights abuses were employed with the intention of suppressing
opposition to environmental damage caused by oil drilling activities, Wiwa v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 92 (2d Cir. 2000); an allegation that a military supplier aided in
genocide, Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 453 F. Supp. 2d 633, 668
(S.D.N.Y. 2006); an allegation that trade unionists were subjected to human rights violations
including torture, kidnapping, and unlawful detention as retaliation for a planned work stoppage,
Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, Inc., 416 F.3d 1242, 1245 (11th Cir. 2005).
132. Michael P. Scharf & Thomas C. Fischer, Foreword to Symposium, Universal
Jurisdiction: Myths, Realities, and Prospects, 35 NEw ENG. L. REV. 227, 227-28 (2001). Such
countries include Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Israel, Switzerland, and others. Id.
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B. Acts of State, Comity, and the Separation of Powers

To say it is permissible for federal law to govern the behavior of
U.S. nationals abroad is not to deny that there are often good reasons for
courts to decline jurisdiction. For example, courts may decline
jurisdiction when the subject matter of a case is such that ruling on it
would require a court to evaluate the act of a foreign state in its
sovereign capacity. 133 The "act of state" doctrine is a defense on the
merits or "rule of decision" that can be invoked by private parties. U.S.
courts generally presume that acts of foreign sovereigns in their own
territories are valid, 34 and even if not, such issues are better dealt with
by the executive branch. 135 This doctrine is based on both the domestic
separation of powers doctrine and an international principle of comity, a
courtesy between states that is generally expected though not legally
required. Accordingly, the "act of state" doctrine is imposed by U.S.
courts out of respect for other branches of U.S. government as well as
for other nations, but not on the basis of international law.
The "act of state" doctrine provided the grounds for denying
jurisdiction in American Banana.'36 In that case, a U.S. plantation owner
sued a competitor for violation of the Sherman Act.137 The Court
declined to pass judgment in this case, since to do so would require it to
judge an act of state, namely Costa Rica's decision to seize the
plaintiff's land.138 It is on the basis of this doctrine (and this decision)
that the foreign compulsion or foreign law defense emerged in anti-trust
law. The foreign compulsion defense in Title VII also emerged from
it.139

A foreign laws defense may be broader than what the Constitution

133. See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (2000). This reasoning does not
typically apply when the act of state is not in its sovereign capacity, but rather in a commercial one,
of which employment certainly is a case. Id.; see also EEOC Guidance, supra note 13, § 605,
2169, at 2236 (stating that the Attorney General should be consulted where there is an issue about
the scope of foreign law or treaties).
134. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,401 (1964); MALANCZUK, supra
note 117, at 121-22.
135. See Banco Nacional, 376 U.S. at 431-33; see also Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.,
213 U.S. 347, 357-58 (1909) (refusing to exercise jurisdiction over the Costa Rican government in
an anti-trust case).
136. Am. Banana, 213 U.S. at 359.
137. Seeid. at 353-54.
138. Id. at 356-59; see also LOWENFELD, supra note 124, at 72 (discussing Am. Banana, 213
U.S. at 353-59).
139. Poznanski Cook, supra note 6, at 143; see also Am. Banana, 213 U.S. at 356-57 (noting
the territorial nature of statutes and the authority of a sovereign).
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and international comity require because in some instances Congress has
instructed courts to hear cases in which an act of state is alleged to
violate international law. 140 Hence, the "act of state" doctrine does not
necessarily prevent Congress from similarly instructing courts to
consider whether a foreign law defense is valid, for example, under
international human rights law. Absent such authorization, should the
employment law of another country require a U.S. or U.S.-controlled
employer to violate Title VII in direct contradiction to that country's
international commitments to the United States in the form of Human
Rights Treaties or International Labour Organization Conventions, U.S.
courts nonetheless might be bound to accept such a defense as valid.
This would be in line with the EEOC Enforcement Guidance, which
gives employers a simple, secure test in judging the legality of
discriminatory actions abroad: If the discriminatory action is mandated
by the host country's legal code, the defense is valid.
C. The Legality of ExtraterritorialReach
To sum up, although employment discrimination law may be
unique as an application of nationality jurisdiction in the civil context, it
is a rather modest extension of jurisdiction in the context of international
law generally and in that of U.S. law specifically. International law
would not prohibit extending Title VII to offer aliens protection against
U.S. companies, even when they are employed abroad. Further, a foreign
laws defense based on the "act of state" doctrine assures that U.S.
employers and U.S. employer-controlled employers are not put in the
position of guessing which laws they are bound to obey.
III. POLITICAL AND ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

The Civil Rights Act of 1964141 (along with other civil rights
legislation) gives legal effect to the anti-caste sentiment or belief that it
is unfair to assign benefits and burdens to people on the basis of their
identity. This value is naturally in tension with an equally old and
important liberty sentiment or belief that it is unfair to strap individual
private actors with moral obligations they do not want, at least not when
reasonable minds could disagree. The legislation was expressly designed
to correct individual and cultural commitments that violate the anti-caste

140.

LOWENFELD, supra note 124, at 526-27 (discussing 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (2000)).

141.

42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000h-6 (2000).
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norm. It is the result of decades of political struggle, and that struggle is
ongoing. 142
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act prohibits discrimination on the
basis of national origin, religion, race, or sex inside the United States
and outside it. 143 Its reach into foreign workplaces is restricted to U.S.

employers and foreign employers abroad controlled by U.S. employers.
It only regulates foreign employers that are not U.S. employer-controlled
144
when such employers maintain workplaces in the United States.
Having established that Title VII's extraterritorial application is
legitimate under international law and, in a limited way, necessary for
maintaining protections inside the United States, a deeper political and
ethical question comes into focus: What justifies U.S. export of antidiscrimination law at all?
This section will review the purposes of anti-discrimination law in
employment, along with some of its classic objections. It will then
consider two prominent arguments for understanding the extraterritorial
extension of the values embodied in civil rights legislation, either as
frank ethnocentrism or as one aspect of participation in complex cultural
dialogue. Finally, it will reconsider U.S. unilateral intervention into
foreign workplaces from the perspective of the exigencies of
globalization.
A. The Purposes ofAnti-DiscriminationLaw in Employment
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted on the basis of some of
145
the most important norms and values of U.S. law and culture.
Prohibitions on caste, such as the proscription on titles of nobility and
bills of attainder, have been woven into the Constitution from the
beginning. Though that same founding document counted people held in
the bondage of slavery as partial people and excluded women from the

142.

See, e.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79-82 (1998) (quoting

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(I)). Gay men, lesbians, and transsexuals are protected from discrimination
by local legislation in some places, but they are still mostly excluded from protection at the federal
and constitutional level. Whether the Supreme Court's decision in Oncale will ultimately provide a
basis for protecting such individuals from discrimination generally has yet to be determined. That
case did provide the possibility of a same-sex sexual harassment claim on the basis of Title VII. d

at 82.
143. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-I to -3.
144. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l(c).
145. See generally Llewellyn E. Thompson 11, The Civil Rights Act of 1964: Present at Its
Birth, 29 U.S.F. L. REv. 681 (1995) (discussing the events leading up to, and the Senate vote
responsible for, the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
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franchise, subsequent amendments have remedied these cheats on the
country's founding ideals.
In addition to giving the anti-caste norm the force of law, Title VII
also represents a carefully crafted shift in the balance between the
traditionally delineated public and private spheres of life in the United
States. While the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution
protect individuals from state-imposed discrimination, Title VII, like
section 1981 before it, protects individuals from discrimination by
private actors. In their capacity as private persons, individuals may
harbor racist, sexist, or religious biases, and they may express such
sentiments through their speech, associations, or even their consumer
choices. However, they may not discriminate in employment on the
basis of such biases.
There are several classic objections to imposing the anti-caste norm
through legislation such as this. An argument of economic efficiency is
worth consideration: Richard Epstein argues that such legislation is
unnecessary, since irrational choices based on employee identity rather
than qualification will hurt employers economically.1 46 Thus, a
discriminating employer will be less competitive in the market. 147 So
long as the use of force is proscribed, the market will punish and correct
cultural biases. 148 Thus, the interference with liberty Title VII mandates
is unnecessary and possibly counterproductive. "In a world of free
access to open markets, systematic discrimination, even by a large
majority, offers little peril to the isolated minority. Unconstrained by
external force, members of minority groups are free to search for jobs
with those firms that do want to hire them.' 49 Though arguments like
this have not carried the day in the domestic context, they are apparently
gaining ascendancy - and their force is arguably much stronger - in the
international context, where foreign direct investment and free trade are
often seen as panaceas for a state's economic woes. 5 ° The economic
efficiency argument is problematic. First, discrimination may not be
irrational in a context where social and economic inequalities of
opportunity and background are pervasive and correlative with
disfavored identity characteristics such as race, gender, and religion. So,

146. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN
DISCRIMINATION LAWS 41-43 (1992).

147.

Id.

148.

Id.at41-43,47.

149.

Id. at 32.

GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT

150. See Alan 0. Sykes, Comparative Advantage and the Normative Economics of
International Trade Policy, I J.INT'L ECON. L. 49, 60-61 (1998).
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the number of qualified persons passed over might be insignificant
enough that it would not hurt an employer's business. Perhaps more
importantly, the qualifications themselves are often tied to experience.
Consequently, if systematic discrimination is pervasive, then fewer
members of disfavored groups will be qualified. Finally, if it is true that
the market can correct individual and cultural biases, it works
remarkably slowly. The Equal Employment Opportunities Commission
shows no signs of closing down due to lack of complaints.
An older argument against discrimination law generally is that it is
a violation of the freedom of association to force an individual to work
with people she does not want to. This argument has more or less fallen
by the way-side as overtly racist groups have lost mainstream appeal. It
gains force in the international context, however, since respect for
cultural autonomy bears a close relation to the norms of tolerance and
respect for difference that Title VII represents.
Whether one considers discrimination to be wrong because it is
unfair, because it violates human dignity, or even because it is
inefficient, the norm against employment discrimination is firmly rooted
in U.S. culture. It has developed in direct conflict with the equally firmly
rooted countervailing norms of white supremacy, patriarchy, and
prescriptive Protestantism. It is also in tension with a libertarian instinct
that has been gaining currency domestically, particularly with those
engaged in international economic enterprises. This background brings
our questions sharply into focus: How can the United States unironically promulgate values with such a pedigree abroad? On what
possible basis could remedial legislation such as this be extended beyond
U.S. territorial borders? On the other hand, why should U.S. companies
be allowed to adopt the caste systems of the cultures where they invest if
they do not have to? These are philosophical, ethical, and political
questions.
B. Relativism, FrankEthnocentrism, and Global Interdependence
Richard Rorty and Seyla Benhabib, two prominent social, political
and ethical philosophers, disagree over how to understand values like the
anti-caste norm. For Rorty, westerners would be better off embracing
their heritage and acknowledging their perspectives as "frankly5
ethnocentric" as they promulgate their values among non-westerners.' 1
151. Richard Rorty, Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in 14 COSMOPOLITICS: THINKING AND
FEELING BEYOND THE NATION 45, 56 (Pheng Cheah & Bruce Robbins eds., 1998).
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He argues that westerners should point out how well our norms have
served us in the hope that non-western cultures may also find them
useful. 52 Benhabib challenges the notion that universal values are
essentially or uniquely western values, 153 and at the same time cautions
against the "conflation of validity and genesis."'' 54 She argues that
"[p]olitically, the right to cultural self-expression needs to be grounded
upon, rather than considered an alternative to, universally recognized
citizenship rights.' 55
In Justice as a Large Loyalty, Rorty offers a series of examples of
expanding and contracting loyalties to illustrate how a perceived conflict
could occur between justice and loyalty, for example, when a family
member has committed murder for which an innocent person will hang,
can be better understood as a conflict between loyalties to relatively
larger and smaller groups. 156 Thus, when the CEO of Caterpillar
explained that relocating operations abroad was "positive" because it
was not "realistic for 250 million Americans to control so much of the
world's GNP,"'' 57 he could be understood to express a larger loyalty to
all of humanity over and against the small group of workers no longer in
his employ. 158 The significance of replacing the term "justice" with the
term "loyalty" has to do with moral psychology. Rorty rejects terms like
"reason" and "universal moral obligation," preferring to focus his
59
attention on "affectional relations" like trust.
Rorty offers an image of moral development that begins with local,
reciprocal loyalty relationships and moves from these to ever greater
abstractions, to ever widening concepts of who should count as "one of
us."' 60 This image of an expanding circle is contrasted with a more
traditional Kantian image in which reason or universal human nature
underlie our everyday relations, giving them the same foundation as our
relations with any others.' 6' According to the Kantian view, a moral
conflict will often be experienced as a conflict between reason

152.

See id.
See SEYLA BENHABIB, THE CLAIMS OF CULTURE: EQUALITY AND DIVERSITY IN THE
GLOBAL ERA 24-25 (2002).

153.

154.
155.
156.

Id. at 47.
Id. at 26.
Rorty, supra note 151, at 45.

157. Id. at 57 n.1 (quoting Caterpillar CEO Donald Fites in EDWARD N. LUYTWAK, THE
ENDANGERED AMERICAN DREAM 184 (1993)).

158.
159.
160.
161.

See id. at 46.
See id. at 47.
Seeid. at45.
See id.
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(universal) and sentiment (purely personal).1 62 According to Rorty's
view, a moral conflict will be experienced as conflicting loyalties, even
conflicting selves. 163 The larger the group, the less strongly one will
identify with it and the more necessary it is to codify obligations into
laws. 164
Because thicker, more local loyalties form the basis of abstract
principles like the liberal maxim, '"Do not make arbitrary distinctions
between moral subjects," rather than the other way around, Rorty urges
his readers to drop the idea that pure reason is "always in danger of
being contaminated by irrational feelings, which introduce arbitrary
discriminations among persons."' 165 Instead we should face up to the fact
that the norms of liberal democracy simply reflect the customs of liberal
societies. 66 And, "it is better not to say that the liberal West is better
informed about rationality and justice, and instead to say that, in making
167
demands on nonliberal societies, it is simply being true to itself."'
Thus, the United States might promote the anti-caste ideal because the
people of the United States would not like themselves if it did not. It
might limit protections to its citizens in foreign workplaces because
locally-hired workers in foreign countries do not count as "one of us," at
least not yet.
Recasting prominent liberal theory in these new terms, Rorty
suggests that moral and social theory should take rationality not as an
authority that tells people what to do, but as an appeal to the already
enduring beliefs and identifications of an interlocutor. 168 Moreover, he
suggests that, in some contexts, moral rationality might be understood as
the offer of a new moral identity, that is, of a new, larger loyalty. 169 This
follows because any unforced agreement about what to do will create a
community "and will, with luck, be the initial stage in expanding the
circles of those whom each party to the agreement had previously taken
to be 'people like ourselves."",170 Thus, when a liberal concludes that
someone is irrational, it means that the two do not share sufficient

162.

See id. at 47-48.

163.

See id. at 48.

164. Id.
165. Id. at 49. The term "liberal," as Rorty uses it, denotes democracy with protections for
individual rights. It is logically opposed to authoritarian and majoritarian governments, not to

conservative politics in the twenty-first century.
166. See id.
167. Id. at 50.
168. See id. at 53-54.
169. Id. at 54.
170. Id.
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beliefs or desires to make "fruitful conversation about the issue in
dispute." '' At this point, the liberal will reluctantly turn 1 to
72 less
communicative means, such as threat, force, or presumably, law.'
Rorty rejects a stronger version of rationality, in which liberal
theorists insist that if the two argue for long enough in good faith, the
force of the better argument will prevail, if only as a matter of
principle. 73 He deflates this idea, describing it as an excuse to pay
oneself an empty compliment by describing one's own resolution to
conflicts of loyalty as "rational."' 74 Perhaps even more importantly, such
a rhetorical 75gesture is not useful in helping individuals or groups reach
agreement. 1

Rorty asserts that non-westerners were justified in their skepticism
when western conquerors invaded their lands, claiming to be acting
under God's authorization. 76 He says they are justified in their
skepticism today when westerners urge them to change their ways, to
become more rational. 177 He ultimately claims:
If we [w]esterners could get rid of the notion of universal moral
obligations created by membership in the species, and substitute the
idea of building a community of trust between ourselves and others,
we might be in a better position to persuade non-[w]estemers of the
advantages ofjoining in that community.178
Rorty does not offer much guidance on the question of whether to
impose egalitarian norms on foreign employers and workplaces, but his
discussion suggests a way to understand what is happening when such
norms are imposed extraterritorially. For Rorty, it is all about "us.' 7 9
The existence of domestic anti-discrimination laws in the United States
shows that we, as a people, have withdrawn from conversation about
whether we value equality. Those who disagree may present their
arguments, but they may not act on their disagreement by engaging in
employment discrimination. If they do, they will be dealt with through
force of law. The situation is only slightly different in the transnational

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Id. at 55.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 55-56.
Id. at 56.
Id.

Id.
Id. at 56-57.
See id. at 45.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol24/iss2/4

30

Roberts: Correcting Culture: Extraterritoriality and U.S. Employment Discr
20071

CorrectingCulture

context. To the extent that a foreign employer wants to operate within
our borders, it must abide by our rules. To the extent that a U.S.
employer or a U.S. employer-controlled employer wants to invest
abroad, it is saddled with promulgating not only the values of capitalism,
but also the egalitarian norms of Title VII, at least insofar as they hire
U.S. citizen employees. Abiding by this norm, which has worked so well
for us in the United States, the employer effectively becomes a model
and an instrument of change for the cultures among which it resides. The
justification for this lies in western identity, and to some extent it offers
this identity to those who trust and accept its liberal values.
It should be noted that this justification is somewhat undercut by a
stratified working environment, whether at home or abroad. This is true
where upper management is composed of citizens from a sending
country, enjoying privileges and protections that are denied to the citizen
employees of a receiver country.
In her essay, "Nous" et Les "Autres" (We and the Others): Is
Universalism Ethnocentric?, Seyla Benhabib argues that the worry that
universalism is ethnocentric rests on the false assumptions that western
culture is radically different from other cultures, that it is a coherent
whole, and that it provides a homogenous identity. 180 She argues instead
that cultures and societies "are not holistic but polyvocal, multilayered,
decentered, and fractured systems of action and signification."' 8' She
questions whether the legal and moral universalism that Rorty and others
advocate "can be defended' 82without a strong commitment to the
normative content of reason."'
Benhabib describes Rorty's "ethnocentrism" as universalist within
"framework relativism."'' 83 This is to say that Rorty's liberal
commitments to universal values are qualified by the framework of
liberalism or perhaps of western culture. 184 The irrational person from
his discussion simply falls out of the framework into another
incommensurable one. 185 Benhabib claims such views must fail "because
the very process of individuating and identifying frameworks contradicts
the claims of framework relativism."'186 That is, such visions of judgment
and justification require frameworks within which to identify and

180. BENHABIB, supra note 153, at 24.
181. Id. at 25-26.
182. Id. at 28.
183.

Id.

184. See id.
185. See id. at 28, 33.
186. Id. at 28.
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evaluate frameworks.1 7 She reasons that cultures must bear some
similarities to each other or else we could not recognize such complex
cultural phenomena as myth, marriage, or prayer. 188 Deciding which
frameworks are better requires independent judgment, and, she proposes,
89
this is best understood as requiring "complex cultural dialogues."1
Benhabib specifically singles out Rorty for criticism. Given that the
difference between disagreements within a culture are not different in
kind from disagreements across cultures, Rorty's use of such terms as
"we," "them," and particularly, "ethnocentric," is misleading. 190 Rorty
uses the term "ethnos" to denote the group of people with whom one can
have a fruitful conversation, but such an ethnos "has a shifting identity
and no fixed boundaries."' 9' Benhabib argues that the "we" with which
Rorty identifies ought not to be the "we" of western civilization at all,
but rather the "we" of liberalism or even the "we" of a community of
conversation defined by the topic or task at hand.' 92
Benhabib is careful to limit her critique, noting that there may be
incommensurabilities between culturally embedded points of view:
"Experiences of incommensuration can range from total bafflement in
the face of another culture's rituals and practices, to more mundane and
frustrating encounters with others when . . . '[we] just don't get it. ' ' ' 9'
Such experiences might lead to violence, but they might also lead to
"extending the horizons of one's comprehension.' ' 94 What she means by
this is that conversations in cases where cultural viewpoints conflict may
result in the revision of both viewpoints, or of many viewpoints, through
a process of "mutual challenging, questioning, and learning. ' And, she
notes, some of the most pressing issues of our day arise from96 real
confrontation between cultures that are materially interdependent. 1
Benhabib argues that globalization is "increasing the effects of
local activities on a global scale" such that "the articulation of a
pluralistically enlightened ethical universalism on a global scale emerges

187. Seeid.

188. Id. at 30.
189. Id.at28-29.
190. Id. at 32 (referring to Richard Rorty, Solidarity or Objectivity?, in POST-ANALYTIC
PHILOSOPHY passim (John Raj chman & Cornel West eds., 1985)).
191. Id. at 32-33.
192. Seeid. at33.
193. Id. at 31.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 34-35.
196. Id. at 35.
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as a possibility and a necessity."' 197 The global situation gives all of us a
pragmatic imperative to extend the community of conversation as
broadly as we can. 198To make a community of interdependence a moral
community requires the members of that community "to settle those
issues of common concern to all via dialogical procedures in which all
are participants."' 99 By "all," she means both the "all" of humanity as
implicated in the pragmatic situation of planetary interdependence and
the "all" of those who may be affected by a particular decision.200 To be
a dialogue, the conversation must take place in accordance with the
norms of universal respect and egalitarian reciprocity. 20 ' That is, it
cannot be a dialogue if participants are silenced, threatened, coerced, or
tricked. While such dialogue may be unattainable in reality, these norms
serve as guides.20 2
Given that most, if not all, cultures fall short of these generalized
attitudes embracing human equality - attitudes that Benhabib finds
necessary to reach reasoned, uncoerced agreement - she places hope in
the same transnational mechanisms that bring the world into a situation
of global interdependence. As conversations and confrontations between
and among cultures spread, through economic and military engagement,
as well as through international law and international threats, she
believes and hopes the generalized attitude of moral equality will
spread.20 3
At least insofar as these attitudes may spread through conversation,
Benhabib recommends understanding three levels of normative life
within a "culture," and understanding that cultures are not pure wholes
and may not be definable at the margins. 2 04 These three levels are the
moral, the ethical, and the evaluative.205 The moral refers to justice; what
is right for people qua human beings.20 6 The ethical refers to
identification; what is right for members of this community qua this
community.20 7 The evaluative refers to whatever individuals or

197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

Id. at 35-36.
Id. at 36.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 36-37.
Id. at 37.
Id. at 38-39.
Id.at 40.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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communities think is necessary for human happiness. °8 On her view
then, Rorty conflates the moral primarily with the ethical, but also with
the evaluative level of normative life. Benhabib suggests that we might
take issue with some aspects of the moral, ethical, or evaluative practices
of a particular community without rejecting its values totally. 20 9 Such

critical engagement is as possible with one's own community as with
someone else's.
Benhabib closes her essay with a meditation on John Locke's
Second Treatise on Government,2 an important document in western
intellectual history.211 It not only offers the ideal of government by
consent among equals, 212 it also engages "in a complex cultural dialogue
that positions and repositions the 'we' and the 'others' in complex,
multiple, and unpredictable ways. ,21 3 For example, it casts Amerindians
as being "just like Europeans; their otherness . . . buried in the early

stages of our own past," justifying colonization as a speeding up of their
development.214 It excludes "women, propertyless servants, and other
races from the ark of equality., 215 While Locke can be criticized, and
justly so, for his "fanciful reconstructions of the hypothetical beginnings
of human history," Benhabib distinguishes these weaknesses from his
"philosophical argument concerning consent and political legitimacy., 216
That argument has prevailed as the "foundation for all democratic theory
217
and practice.,
Benhabib offers more guidance than Rorty about whether to impose
egalitarian norms on foreign employers and workplaces. She suggests a
different way to understand what is going on when such norms are
imposed extraterritorially. For Benhabib, the commercial activities of
U.S. employers abroad can be expected to have some instrumental effect
in transforming the communities in which they operate. Discrimination
is non-egalitarian: it precludes the possibility of moral community. Thus,
the United States is quite justified in requiring its nationals to abide by
these minimum moral standards. Benhabib's instruction to consider the

208. Id.
209. Id. at 40-41.
210. JOHN LOCKE, OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT SECOND TREATISE (Henry Regnery Co. 1968)
(1690).
211. BENHABIB, supra note 153, at 42-48.
212. Id. at 46-47.
213. Id.at 46.
214. Id.
215. Id. at47.
216. Id.
217. Id.
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polyvocal nature of communities and cultures might also lead us to note
that Title VII will most likely be invoked by individuals who have
suffered or believe they have suffered discrimination, whether they are
U.S. citizens or not. Thus, while Title VII may disfavor discriminatory
attitudes within a given culture, complaints by members of the same
culture indicate that that culture does not maintain a univocal
appreciation for such discrimination.
C. Recasting the Dialogue
Benhabib and Rorty's arguments are as notable for what they share
as for the points on which they diverge. Both understand moral
rationality as requiring a non-coercive discussion in a community of
conversation. Both understand the motive force behind such
conversations as pragmatic. Both understand moral experience to be
largely rooted in the accidents of history, including the increasing
importance today of the global economy. Additionally, both recognize
the history of the colonial era that overshadows discussions of crosscultural moral dialogue.
Benhabib is right about Rorty's use of the term "ethnocentric." He
would surely agree that the United States, for example, or even the West
is not a monolith. While he might not take issue with the narrative
history of the anti-caste norm I articulated above, his "ethnos" more
closely resembles a set of political and ethical commitments than what
most of us understand by the term. Nonetheless, we should be mindful
that U.S. law, too, emerges from a specific country with a specific
history. When Title VII is enforced abroad, it is enforced on behalf of
the people of the United States, not on behalf of liberals. And, when
Rorty suggests westerners have learned from their history, that is not a
theoretical claim. So, while Benhabib is also right to distinguish liberal
norms analytically from their histories, it would be a mistake to think
such history does not stick to these norms, especially when they are
carried by former colonizers into the lands of the formerly colonized.
Assuming Benhabib's characterization of Rorty's point of view as
framework relativism is accurate, she has given us no reason to think
that we need an outside perspective in order to pick out relevant
characteristics of other cultures. How could we even begin to recognize
myth as myth or marriage as marriage if we did not already have some
familiarity with it in our own background? If it is possible, it requires
education, not an outside perspective from which to adjudicate between
frameworks, whatever that might mean. Incommensurability of culture is
Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2007
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not the key for Rorty, but incommensurability of value commitments,
beliefs, etc., up to the point of break-down. Thus, on his view, there is
tremendous room for overlap and hence for conversation between
members of the same or different communities. If there is real
incommensurability, then the apparent result would be a lack of
engagement, not engagement on a higher level. Science and religion may
provide just one example: A religious explanation of science and a
scientific explanation of religion are both possible. But neither is capable
of refuting the other. They don't operate in the same logical space. By
contrast, racism and the anti-caste norm operate in at least very similar
logical space, whether they occur in a transnational context or not. In
other words, to argue about whether discrimination is acceptable in a
given context is already to have granted some level of
commensurability.
Indeed, when we are talking about applying Title VII to a
workplace, we are talking about a specific type of context in which the
forces of globalization are already in tension with traditional cultures,
including our own. Although the term "globalization" initially
characterized the recently accelerated emergence of international
financial markets, 2 8 it encompasses many overlapping trends of
economic, social, political, and cultural change. 2' 9 These include rapid
global communication, rapid deployment of short-term and foreign
direct investments, and changing gender relations. 220 Thus, the question
is not whether to be involved in global cultural transformation, as if
abstention were possible. Rather, it is how to be involved, and how to be
involved responsibly.
Unrestricted markets will not necessarily correct cultural biases on
their own, at least not quickly. 1 One need not look far to see how
violently individuals and governments may defend cultural norms of
subordination against economic interventions that threaten to destabilize
their power. Can wealthy countries such as the United States responsibly
allow their wealthier citizens to profit from foreign investment without

218. Though states began to lift capital controls in the 1970s, see THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE
LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE 114-15 (1999), the emergence of global financial markets began

accelerating much more recently, in 1987, when the United Kingdom deregulated capital and
securities. See Manuel Castells, Information Technology and Global Capitalism, in GLOBAL
CAPITALISM 52, 53 (Will Hutton & Anthony Giddens eds., 2001).
219. Anthony Giddens & Will Hutton, In Conversation, in GLOBAL CAPITALISM, supra note
218, at 1, 1-2.
220. See id. at 1-2.
221. See supra Part lll.A (discussing the purposes of anti-discrimination law).
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some safeguards? The many human rights and International Labour
Organization conventions on the subject suggest not. Although
multilateral, international regimes may be preferable from the
perspective of a global community of complex cultural dialogue or
conversation, currently no coherent international legal regime is in a
position to redress grievances as Title VII does. Against this
background, Title VII appears as an important stop-gap measure and one
that would be justified in reaching farther than it does.
IV. IMPLICATIONS

The extraterritorial provisions of Title VII and other employment
civil rights laws, as written, are consistent both with international law
and with the values that inform respect for foreign cultures and the legal
protection of civil rights. However, as the law currently stands,
extraterritorial civil rights law creates unstable and uneven employment
rights. Courts should not allow this instability to prevent them from
enforcing the law in light of its purposes at least in workplaces within
the territorial United States. Even better, Congress could extend
jurisdiction to include all employees of U.S. employers and foreign
employers controlled by U.S. employers. The law's current shortcomings aside, since the United States, its people, its businesses and
their employees are already deeply engaged in processes of social,
cultural, and economic transformation at home and abroad, holding all
U.S. employers accountable to minimum standards of conduct towards
their employees represents a step in the direction of responsible
participation in an increasingly interdependent, global community.
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